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MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO THIRD
PARTIES: EMPLOYERS' VICARIOUS LIABILITY TO EMPLOYEES
OF AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1994)
I. FACTS
In 1984, Defendant-Appellee, ANG Coal Gasification Co. [herein-
after ANG], hired Ceramic Cooling Tower Co. [hereinafter CCT]I to
replace plastic tiles with ceramic tiles in the water cooling towers of its
coal gasification plant in Beulah, North Dakota.2 CCT was hired as an
independent contractor. 3 At that time, Plaintiff-Appellant, Melvin Fleck,
was an employee of CCT.4
Fleck's job at CCT included cleaning the interior of the cooling
tower and removing the plastic tiles on the inside of the tower. 5 The
working conditions inside the towers were very dirty and wet, tiles were
coated with a slimy, black residue, left from the water that flowed
through the towers, and the air was extremely humid.6 Through their
own testing, ANG discovered potentially harmful bacteria in the water
and slime inside the towers. 7 Consequently, ANG provided CCT em-
ployees with surgical masks, slickers, boots, and gloves, and issued an
internal memorandum stating that this gear should be worn whenever
anyone, including CCT employees, worked inside the towers. 8 In
addition, ANG personnel tested air samples to ensure there was sufficient
oxygen inside the towers. 9 An ANG plant supervisor also periodically
walked through the towers to check on the progress of the work.lO
CCT's construction manager required all CCT employees to wear the
1. Brief for Appellant at 5, Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1994)
(No. 940062). CCT is based out of Fort Worth, Texas. Id.
2. Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522 N.W.2d 445,446-47 (N.D. 1994). In 1984, ANG, a
Delaware corporation, was the "project administrator" of the Beulah plant, having complete control
over all construction and operations. Brief for Appellant at 5 n.3, Fleck (No. 940062). The plant was
owned by Great Plains Gasification Associates, a North Dakota partnership formed by several foreign
corporations. Id. at 4 n.2.
3. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 447. This fact was not disputed by the parties. Id.
4. Id. At the time of the accident, Fleck had been employed by CCT for about one week. Brief
for Appellant at 5, Fleck (No. 940062). Because this case was an appeal from a summary judgment in
favor of ANG, the North Dakota Supreme Court drew all factual inferences in favor of Melvin Fleck.
and thus assumed the truth of his assertions. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 448. Therefore, the facts in this
Comment are also presented in the light most favorable to Fleck.
5. Appellant's Brief at 5, Fleck (No. 940062).
6. Brief for Appellant at 5, Fleck (No. 940062). Fleck's supervisor described the air inside the
towers as "clouds of fog." Id.
7. Id. at 7-8. ANG had microbiologists and laboratory personnel on staff who tested the water
and slime in the towers "at least once, sometimes twice, every day." Id.
8. Id. at 6-8.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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protective gear."l. However, despite having a history of asthma, Fleck did
not wear the required face mask.12
On July 30, 1984, Fleck suddenly lost consciousness while working
with a crew inside one of the cooling towers. 13 Fleck was immediately
taken to the plant's first aid station, where the incident was recorded as
occupationally related.14 The following day, Fleck was examined by a
pulmonary and critical care specialist, who diagnosed Fleck's respiratory
problems as asthma, rhinitis, and acute bronchitis.1 5 Fleck received
medication for his illness and was told to return in two months for a
follow-up exam. 16 Fleck did not return for the follow-up exam, but did
apply for and received workers compensation benefits for his injuries.17
In July, 1990, Fleck brought a personal injury action against ANG
in the South Central Judicial District Court, Burleigh County, claiming
that exposure to hazardous chemicals while working in ANG's cooling
towers had caused him to develop occupational asthma. 18 The District
Court granted ANG's motion for summary judgment, and also awarded
costs to ANG.19 The District Court dismissed Fleck's claim on three
grounds.20 First, the District Court held that ANG had not retained
sufficient control over CCT's work to make it liable under section 414
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).21 Second, the court held
that the work being performed by CCT was not "inherently dangerous"
so as to impose liability on ANG under section 427 of the Restatement,
and it also did not involve a "peculiar risk" so as to impose liability on
ANG under section 416 of the Restatement.22 Lastly, the court held that
11. Brief for Appellee at 10, Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1994)
(No. 940062).
12. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 447.
13. Brief for Appellant at 2, Fleck (No. 940062).
14. Id. at 2-3. Fleck was examined by an ANG physician, who advised him that he had
bronchitis and sent him home. Appellee's Brief at 13, Fleck (No. 940062).
15. Brief for Appellee at 13, Fleck (No. 940062). Fleck was examined by Dr. Nicholas Neuman
at the Heart and Lung Clinic of Bismarck. Id.
16. Id. Heck was prescribed anti-inflammatory medications for his rhinitis and bronchitis and his
existing prescription for his previously-diagnosed asthma was reviewed. Id.
17. Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522 N.W.2d 445,447 (N.D. 1994).
18. Id. Fleck alleged that he was exposed to "arsenic, ammonia, chlorides, among other toxic
chemicals and biological substances." Brief for Appellant at 1, Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co.,
522 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1994) (No. 940062).
19. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 447. In its summary judgment motion, ANG asserted "that it had no
duty to provide for Fleck's safety on the job, that there were no hazardous substances present in the
towers, and that Fleck's injuries were not caused by any exposure while working at the plant." Id.






ANG had not assumed a duty for Fleck's safety under section 324A of
the Restatement.23
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's
decision, holding first that ANG had not retained such control over the
work to be performed by CCT so as to create a duty on ANG to provide
for Fleck's safety under section 414 of the Restatement 24 Furthermore,
and most importantly, the Court held that an employer cannot be held
vicariousl , liable to its independent contractor's employees under
sections 416 and 427 of the Restatement.25 The scope of this Comment
will be limited to the issue of whether an employer may be held vicari-
ously liable to its independent contractors' employees under sections
416 and 427.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. DEVELOPMENT OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE OF EMPLOYER
NON-LIABILITY
It has long been established that an employer is not vicariously
liable for the torts of an independent contractor. 26 The most commonly
accepted rationale supporting the rule is that an employer usually does
not have the right to control the manner in which the work is performed,
since it is the independent contractor's enterprise. 27 Thus, the indepen-
dent contractor, rather than the employer, is responsible for preventing
and distributing the risk.28
However, equally as established as the general rule are the rule's
many exceptions. 29 An often quoted passage states: "Indeed it would
23. Id.
24. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 449.
25. Id. at 454. The North Dakota Supreme Court also held that a prevailing party is entitled to
recover the costs of taking depositions intended for use at trial, even though the action does not
actually go to trial. Id. at 455. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-06(2) (1991) (providing for recovery of
deposition expenses).
26. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRoSSER ANDKEETON ON THE LAW OFTORTS § 71, at 509 (5th ed.
1984).
27. Id.
28. Id. One of the exceptions to the general rule is when the employer does retain control over
the manner in which the work is to be performed. Id. In such a case, the employer has a duty to
exercise that control with reasonable care and may be held directly liable for a failure to do so under
§ 414 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
29. The following are the exceptions to the general rule of employer non-liability contained in
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS (1965): § 410 ("Contractor's Conduct in Obedience to Employer's
Directions"); § 411 ("Negligence in Selection of Contractor"); § 412 ("Failure to Inspect Work of
Contractor After Completion"); § 413 ("Duty to Provide for Taking of Precautions Against Dangers
Involved in Work Entrusted to Contractor"); § 414 ("Negligence in Exercising Control Retained by
Employer"); § 414A ("Duty of Possessor of Land to Prevent Activities and Conditions Dangerous to
Those Outside of Land"); § 415 ("Duty to Supervise Equipment and Methods of Contractors or
Concessionaires on Land Held Open for Public"); § 416 ("Work Dangerous in Absence of Special
1996]
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be proper to say that the rule is now primarily important as a preamble
to the catalog of its exceptions." 30 These exceptions have generally
developed as specific rules to deal with specific situations.31 However,
the primary argument underlying the development of these exceptions is
that since the employer receives the ultimate benefit of the work, it is the
employer's enterprise.3 2 Thus, the employer should be the party re-
sponsible for any risk the enterprise creates. 33 The modem version of
this "enterprise theory" further states that because the employer is
usually closer to the consumer than the contractor, the employer is in a
better position to bear the cost of the risk of the enterprise. 34 This cost
usually constitutes the insurance necessary to distribute the risk, which
the employer can directly pass on to consumers as a cost of business. 35
As stated above, the exceptions to the general rule tend to apply in
particular situations.36 They can, however, be grouped into three general
categories:
1. Negligence of the employer in selecting, instructing, or
supervising the contractor;
2. Non-delegable duties of the employer, arising out of some
relation toward the public or the particular plaintiff; and
3. Work which is specially, peculiarly, or inherently
dangerous .37
Precautions"); § 417 ("Work Done in Public Place"); § 418 ("Maintenance of Public Highways and
Other Public Places"); § 419 ("Repairs Which Lessor is Under a Duty to His Lessee to Make"); § 420
("Repairs Gratuitously Undertaken by Lessor"); § 421 ("Maintenance of Structures on Land Retained
in Lessor's Possession Necessary to Tenant's Enjoyment of Leased Land"); § 422 ("Work on
Buildings and Other Structures on Land"); § 422A ("Work Withdrawing Lateral Support"); § 423
("Making or Repair of Instrumentalities Used in Highly Dangerous Activities"); § 424 ("Precautions
Required by Statute or Regulation"); § 425 ("Repair of Chattel Supplied or Land Held Open to Public
as Place of Business"); § 426 ("Negligence Collateral to Risk of Doing the Work"); § 427
("Negligence as to Danger Inherent in the Work"); § 427A ("Work Involving Abnormally Dangerous
Activity"); § 427B ("Work Likely to Involve Trespass or Nuisance"); § 428 ("Contractor's
Negligence in Doing Work Which Cannot Lawfully be Done Except Under a Franchise Granted to
His Employer"); §429 ("Negligence in Doing Work Which is Accepted in Reliance on the Employer's
Doing the Work Himself'). The first exception was created as early as 1876 in Bower v. Peate, I
Q.B.D. 321, which held an employer liable when his contractor's excavation work undermined the
plaintiff's building's foundation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt. b (1965).
30. Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 277 N.W. 226, 228 (Minn. 1937) (citing
HARPER ON TORTS § 292; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 410-29 cmt. b. (1965)).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt. b. (1965).
32. KEETON ET AL., supra note 26, at 509.
33. Edward J. Henderson, Liability to Employees of Independent Contractors Engaged in
Inherently Dangerous Work: A Workable Workers' Compensation Proposal. 48 FORDHAM L. REv.
1165,1175 (1980).
34. Id. at 1176-77.
35. Id.
36. See Henderson, supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions to the general
rule of non-liability of an employer of an independent contractor).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt. b (1965).
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This Comment will focus on two of the exceptions to the general
rule that fall into the third category. 38 These exceptions are created in
sections 416 and 427 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Generally, sections 416 and 427 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts create exceptions to the general rule by making employers
vicariously liable for the physical harm caused by their independent
contractors when the work the contractors perform creates a "peculiar
risk" to others, or is "inherently dangerous." 39 Specifically, section
416 imposes vicarious liability on the employer of an independent
contractor when the employer should recognize that the work will create
a "peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are
taken. '40 Section 427 holds the employer vicariously liable for physical
harm to others caused by a contractor's negligence when the employer
knows or should know the work is inherently dangerous.41 Sections 416
and 427 are closely related,42 and are, in essence, merely different ways
of stating the same exception to the general rule of employer
non-liability; that the employer will remain liable for injuries caused by
risks which the employer should foresee when it enters into the
contract. 43 The employer cannot shift the responsibility for such risks to
an independent contractor. 44 The difference, if any, usually focuses on
the type of risk.45 Section 416 applies to work which creates a specific,
known risk that should be guarded against, such as excavation of a
street.46 Section 427 applies to work that creates several possible hazards,
such as the use of explosives .47
38. See REsTATEmEmr (SECOND) OF ToRm §§ 416,427 (1965).
39. Id.
40. Id. § 416. Section 416 of the Second Restatement provides:
[O]ne who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should
recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others
unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such
precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in the contract
or otherwise.
Id.
41. Id. § 427. Specifically, § 427 provides:
[Olne who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special danger to
others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to
the work, or which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when making the
contract, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the contractor's
failure to take reasonable precautions against such danger.
Id.
42. Id. § 416 cmt. a.
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B. MAJORITY AND MINORITY VIEWS REGARDING SECTIONS
416 AND 427
In jurisdictions that have adopted both sections 416 and 427 of the
Restatement, one question courts have had to determine is whether the
word "others" used in those sections includes the employees of the
independent contractor. 48 A clear majority position has emerged from
the courts that have considered this issue. 49 Most courts hold that
employees of independent contractors are not included under the
exceptions to the general rule of employer non-liability created by
sections 416 and 427 of the Restatement.50 The most widely accepted
reason for not allowing the employees of independent contractors a
cause of action against the employer is the existence of workers
compensation benefits.51 Although the official Comments to the
Restatement do not address the issue, many courts have used a Special
Note in the 1962 Tentative Draft to the Restatement as persuasive
authority to support the rationale that independent contractors'
employees were not intended to be included under sections 416 and
427.52
48. See infra notes 50 and 54 and accompanying text (citing the jurisdictions that have adopted
the majority and minority views, respectively). This question of whether "others" includes employees
of independent contractors applies to many exceptions to the general rule listed in §§ 410-29 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, because they contain the same language. See Schlenk v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.. 329 N.W.2d 605, 607 (N.D. 1983) (declining to decide whether "others"
as used in §§ 411,413,414,416, 424. and 427 included the employees of an independent contractor).
See also infra note 122 and accompanying text (listing some of the sections that use the term "others"
or similar terms).
49. See infra note 50 and accompanying text (citing the jurisdictions that have adopted the
majority position).
50. The following courts have subscribed to the majority view that employees of independent
contractors are not included under the exceptions to the general rule of employer non-liability: Morris
v. City of Soldotna, 553 P.2d 474 (Alaska 1976); Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Coop., 606 S.W.2d 66
(Ark. 1980); Privette v. Superior Court, 854 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1993): Ray v. Schneider, 548 A.2d 461
(Conn. App. Ct. 1988), cert. denied, 551 A.2d 756 (Conn. 1988); Peone v. Regulus Stud Mills, Inc., 744
P.2d 102 (Idaho 1987); Johns v. New York Blower Co., 442 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Dillard
v. Strecker, 877 P.2d 371 (Kan. 1994); King v. Shelby Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659 (Ky.
1973). cert. denied. 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Rowley v. City of Baltimore, 505 A.2d 494 (Md. 1986);
Vertentes v. Barletta Co., 466 N.E.2d 500 (Mass. 1984); Conover v. Northern States Power Co., 313
N.W.2d 397 (Minn. 1981); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384 (Mo.
1991); Anderson v. Nashua Corp., 519 N.W.2d 275 (Neb. 1994); Sierra Pac. Power Co. v. Rinehart.
665 P.2d 270 (Nev. 1983); Whitaker v. Norman, 551 N.E.2d 579 (N.Y. 1989); Curless v. Lathrop Co.,
583 N.E.2d 1367 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 635 P.2d 426
(Wash. 1981); Wagner v. Continental Casualty Co., 421 N.W.2d 835 (Wis. 1988); Jones v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 1986).
51. Henderson, supra note 33, at 1179-80. See, e.g., Privette, 854 P.2d at 727 (noting that
workers compensation benefits are available, providing relief to injured employees).
52. See Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522 N.W.2d 445, 449-50 n.2 (N.D. 1994) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 15, Special Note 17-18 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962)). This Special
Note provides that §§ 416 and 427 are not applicable to the employees of independent contractors
because of the availability of workers' compensation. Id. The reason, according to William Prosser,
[VOL. 72:181
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The minority view holds, conversely, that independent contractors'
employees are covered under sections 416 and 427 of the Restatement.
53
In the jurisdictions that have adopted this position, 54 coffrts have
generally not taken into account the availability of workers'
compensation benefits as a means of reparation.55 These courts have
determined that sections 416 and 427 impose a non-delegable duty on
the employer to ensure that dangerous work is performed safely.
56
Because of the absolute nature of a non-delegable duty, these courts
have held that the duty is owed to all third parties, including the
independent contractors' employees.57 In the two minority jurisdictions
that have taken into account workers' compensation, Hawaii and New
Hampshire, courts have adopted the minority position because their
workers' compensation statutes only bar actions by employees against
their direct employer, not against third parties. 58 These courts reasoned
that since employers of independent contractors could not be considered
"employers" under either jurisdictions' workers' compensation
schemes under any circumstances, the employee of a contractor may
bring an action against the contractor's employer, which corresponds
with the minority view.59
C. SECTIONS 416 AND 427 IN NORTH DAKOTA LAW
The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized the "inherently
dangerous work" exception to the general rule that employers cannot be
held vicariously liable for the negligence of their independent
for not including the Special Note in the final version of the Restatement was lack of uniformity in the
states' workers' compensation statutes, thus the Restatement took a neutral position. Id. (citing
Discussion of Restatement of Law Second, Torts, 39 A.L.I. Proc. 244-49 (1962)). See also Privette, 854
P.2d at 728-29; Peone, 744 P.2d at 105; Zueck, 809 S.W.2d at 389-90; Tauscher, 635 P.2d at 430 n.7.
53. Henderson, supra note 33, at 1181. See, e.g., Lindler v. District of Columbia, 502 F.2d 495,
499 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (determining that §§ 416 and 427 provide coverage for independent contractors'
employees).
54. The following courts have adopted the minority view which includes employees of
independent contractors under §§ 416 and 427: Lindler, 502 F.2d at 499; Makaneole v. Gampon, 777
P.2d 1183, 1185 (Haw. 1989); Giarratano v. Weitz Co., 147 N.W.2d 824, 834 (Iowa 1967); Vannoy v.
City of Warren, 166 N.W.2d 486. 489 (Mich. App. 1968); Elliott v. Public Serv. Co., 517 A.2d 1185,
1187 (N.H. 1986); Hargrove v. Frommeyer & Co., 323 A.2d 300,308 (Pa. 1974). California had held
the minority position, but adopted the majority view in Privette, 854 P.2d at 729-30.
55. Henderson, supra note 33. at 1181. See Lindler, 502 F.2d at 499; Giarratano, 147 N.W.2d at
834; Vannoy, 166 N.W.2d at 489; Hargrove, 323 A.2d at 308.
56. See, e.g., Vannoy, 166 N.W.2d at 489.
57. Id.
58. See Makaneole, 777 P.2d at 1187: Elliott, 517 A.2d at 1188-89.
59. See Makaneole, 777 P.2d at 1187; Elliott, 517 A.2d at 1188-89. New Hampshire's workers'
compensation scheme does not consider an employer of an independent contractor a "statutory
employer" even When the employer has directly paid the workers' compensation premiums, which it is
required to do if the independent contractor fails to pay. See Elliot, 517 A.2d at 1188-89. North
Dakota's workers' compensation statutes provide that a general contractor who employs an
independent contractor is considered a "statutory employer," and is liable for premium payments if the
independent contractor fails to pay. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(15)(c) (1995).
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contractors in 1912.60 In Ruehl v. Lidgerwood Rural Telephone Co.61
the Lidgerwood Rural Telephone Co. hired Frank Zimmerman to dig the
holes necessary for a new line of telephone poles. 62 The line of holes
went near the plaintiffs farm. 63 Although the contractor had seen the
plaintiff's children nearby while he was digging the holes, he did not
take any precautions to ensure that none of the children would fall into
the holes. 64 The plaintiff's young son fell into one of the holes, and
either drowned or suffocated in the mud.65  The child's father
subsequently brought a negligence action against Lidgerwood
Telephone for failing to take precautions.66 The North Dakota Supreme
Court held that if, in the performance of any kind of job, it is probable
that persons will be injured unless proper precautions are taken, the
person for whom the work is done has a duty to ensure that the work is
done safely. 67  The court added that it was immaterial whether
Zimmerman was an independent contractor or a servant, because
Lidgerwood Rural Telephone Co. was vicariously liable in either case. 68
Ruehl is considered the first case in North Dakota recognizing the
"inherent danger" exception to the general rule of employer
non-liability *69
Following Ruehl, the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted the
language of both sections 416 and 427 of the Restatement in 1979.70 In
Fettig v. Whitman,71 an independent contractor's employee fell through
an uncovered stairwell in the main floor of a house they were
constructing. 72  The injured employee subsequently brought an action
against Whitman, the employer of the independent contractor, relying on
60. Ruehl v. Lidgerwood Rural Tel. Co., 135 N.W. 793 (N.D. 1912).
61. 135 N.W. 793 (ND. 1912).
62. Ruehl v. Lidgerwood Rural Tel. Co., 135 N.W. 793,794 (N.D. 1912).
63. Id. at 794.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 793.
67. Ruehl, 135 N.W. at 795-96.
68. Id. at 796.
69. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Rollohome Corp., 221 N.W.2d 722, 727 (N.D. 1974) (quoting
Schultz & Lindsay Constr. Co. v. Erickson, 352 F.2d 425, 436 (8th Cir. 1965)). Although Ruehl is
considered as recognizing the "inherent danger" exception, it may be more accurately seen as
recognizing the "peculiar risk". exception, based on the examples given in comment a of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965). See Ruehl 135 N.W. at 794; supra notes 46-47 and
accompanying text (explaining the difference between the type of work covered by §§ 416 and 427).
70. Fettig v. Whitman, 285 N.W.2d 517, 521 (N.D. 1979). Although this was the first time the
court used the language of §§ 416 and 427, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, construing North
Dakota law, cited to § 427 in Schultz & Lindsay Construction Co. v. Erickson, 352 F.2d 425, 435-36
(8th Cir. 1965). This citation was subsequently quoted by the Court in Foremost Insurance Co., 221
N.W.2d at 727.
71. 285 N.W.2d 517 (N.D. 1979).
72. Fenig, 285 N.W.2d at 519. The stairway itself was not in place yet, so there was just a hole
in the subfloor. Id.
188 [VOL. 72:181
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the "inherent danger" exception recognized in Ruehl,73 and section
416 of the Restatement.74 In affirming the trial court's dismissal, the
North Dakota Supreme Court quoted the "inherent danger" exception
set forth in section 427 of the Restatement, and also quoted the
"peculiar risk" exception set forth in section 416.of the. Restatement.75
In applying section 427, however, the court found that the construction
of a house was not an "inherently dangerous" activity, thus section 427
did not apply. 76 Furthermore, the court found that the open stairwell was
not a "peculiar risk" the employer should have had warning of, thus
section 416 also did not apply.77 The plaintiff, therefore, did not have a
cause of action under either section.78
In Fettig, the court did not determine the issue of whether sections
416 and 427 applied to the independent contractor's employee. 79 The
court may have allowed the employee of the independent contractor a
cause of action if the work had been either "inherently dangerous" or
involved a "peculiar risk" under sections 416 and 427 of the
Restatement.
In two subsequent cases, the court again chose not to address the
issue of section 416 or 427 applicability.80 In both Peterson v. City of
Golden Valley8' and Schlenk v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,82 the
court found that the type of work involved was not "inherently
dangerous" nor created a "peculiar risk." 83 Thus, in each case, both
sections 416 and 427 were inapplicable based on the type of risk
involved, and again the court failed to resolve whether these sections
apply to an independent contractor's employees. 84
73. Ruehl, 135 N.W. at 795-96.
74. Fettig, 285 N.W.2d at 521.
75. Id. at 521-23.
76. Id. at 521.
77. Id. at 522-23.
78. Id. at 521-23.
79. Fettig, 285 N.w.2d 517.
80. See Peterson v. City of Golden Valley, 308 N.W.2d 550, 554 (N.D. 1981) (finding it
unnecessary to determine whether §§ 416 and 427 apply to employees of independent contractors);
Schlenk v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 329 N.W.2d 605, 607 (N.D. 1983) (declining to determine
whether §§ 416 and 427 apply to employees of independent contractors).
81. 308 N.W.2d 550 (N.D. 1981).
82. 329 N.W.2d 605 (N.D. 1983).
83. See Peterson, 308 N.W.2d at 554; Schlenk, 329 N.W.2d at 610. In Peterson, an employee of
an independent contractor was killed when the trench he was working collapsed. Peterson, 308
N.W.2d at 551. A protective "cage" was available, but was not used at the time of the accident. Id.
The court affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff's case, finding that the risk involved "was not inherent in
or peculiar to" the type of trenching involved in the case. Id. at 554. In Schlenk, an employee of an
independent contractor was injured when he became entangled in a "wire winder." 329 N.W.2d at
606. The court determined that the operation of the "wire winder" did not create any unusual risk of
injury, thus the plaintiff did not have a cause of action. Id. at 610 (footnote omitted).
84. See Peterson, 308 N.W.2d at 554; Schlenk, 329 N.W.2d at 607.
19961
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Because the court had not determined whether sections 416 and 427
of the Restatement applied to independent contractors employees,8 5 the
implication created in Fettig remained a possibility.8 6 Until recently, it
may still have been thought that the North Dakota Supreme Court would
apply sections 416 and 427 of the Restatement to employees of
independent contractors, joining the minority of jurisdictions.
87
However, the court recently resolved the issue by adopting the majority
position in Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co.88
III. ANALYSIS
In Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., the North Dakota Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether employers could be held
vicariously liable to employees of independent contractors under
sections 416 and 427 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.89 In
affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the
Defendant-Appellee, ANG, Chief Justice Vande Walle, writing for a
unanimous court, adopted the majority position. 90 The court held that
sections 416 and 427 of the Restatement do not apply to employees of
independent contractors.91
The court first discussed the purpose behind adopting sections 416
and 427 of the Restatement.92 The court found that the rationale behind
adopting these sections was to ensure innocent plaintiffs a remedy by not
allowing employers to shift their liability for risk-creating work to an
85. Id.
86. See Fettig v. Whitman, 285 N.W.2d 517, 521-23 (N.D. 1979) (implying that if the work
involved in the case had been "inherently dangerous" or involved a "peculiar risk," the court would
have allowed the employee of the independent contractor to maintain an action against the
contractor's employer, thus adopting the minority view).
87. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (citing the jurisdictions that have adopted the
minority view). Two federal cases construing North Dakota law did conclude that the North Dakota
Supreme Court would adopt the majority view prior to Fleck. Olson v. Pennzoil Co., 943 F.2d 881 (8th
Cir. 1991) (determining that employees of an independent contractor are not third parties within the
meaning of §§ 416 and 427); Ackerman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 555 F. Supp. 93 (D.N.D. 1982) (determining
that legislative intent indicated opposition to imposing liability on the employer of a contractor).
88. 522 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1994).
89. Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522 N.W.2d 445,449-54 (N.D. 1994).
90. Id. at 454. See also supra note 50 and accompanying text (listing jurisdictions that have
adopted the majority position).
91. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 454.
92. Id. at 451. Before discussing their first argument, the court recognized that the Restatement
does not provide any guidance regarding whether a contractors' employees are included under §§ 416
and 427. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 449-50 n.2. However, the court did note that in a Special Note to a
tentative draft of the Restatement, it was stated that employees of independent contractors were not
intended to be covered under sections 416 and 427. Id. See supra note 52 and accompanying text
(discussing how this Special Note has been used as persuasive authority for many courts adopting the
majority position). However, it appears that the Special Note did not weigh heavily in their decision
because it was mentioned only in a footnote. See Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 449-50 n.2.
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independent contractor. 93 Following the California Supreme Court, the
North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that since workers'
compensation guarantees injured employees a remedy, allowing
independent contractors' employees a remedy under sections 416 and
427 serves no additional social interest. 94  Therefore, workers'
compensation should provide the relief for injured independent
contractors' employees, as it is the preferred remedy for job-related
injuries .95
In addition, the court stated that since independent contractors
necessarily include the cost of workers' compensation premiums in their
contracts, employers have already indirectly paid for these benefits, as
well as the exclusive remedy provisions they provide. 96 Therefore,
allowing independent contractors' employees a cause of action under
sections 416 and 427 would deny employers of independent contractors
the exclusive remedy provisions included in the workers' compensation
benefits for which they have already paid. 97
The court further noted the "incongruous result" that would occur
if employers could be held vicariously liable to employees of
independent contractors. 98  The court determined that allowing
independent contractors' employees a cause of action under sections
416 and 427 would subject employers to greater liability than if they
used their own employees to perform dangerous work. 9 9 If a cause of
action was allowed, employers who used their own employees would
only have to pay workers' compensation premiums, while employers
that hired contractors would be subject to tort liability for injuries to the
contractors' employees. 0 0 For cost reasons, an employer would likely
use his own, possibly inexperienced employees, rather than hire a skilled
93. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 451 (citing McLean v. Kirby Co., 490 N.W.2d 229, 235 (ND. 1992)).
94. Id. (citing Privette v. Superior Court, 854 P.2d 721,723 (Cal. 1993)).
95. Id. (citing Peone v. Regulus Stud Mills. Inc., 744 P.2d 102. 106 (Idaho 1987) (stating that it
would be anomalous to allow an employee of an independent contractor to recover in tort when the
accident is employment-related)).
96. Id. For the exclusive remedy provisions of North Dakota's workers' compensation system,
see N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1995) (providing that workers' compensation benefits are the sole
remedy for an injured employee against a complying employer); Id. § 65-04-28 (barring common law
actions by injured employees against complying employers). Even if the independent contractor fails
to pay the workers compensation premiums, the employer, if considered a general contractor, will still
end up paying for them under § 65-01-02(15)(c), which imposes liability on the employer for the
unpaid premiums. Id. § 65-01-01(15)(c).
97. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 451-52 (citing Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 635 P.2d
426, 430 (Wash. 1981) (stating that the employee of an independent contractor "already has a
remedy; one which the owner has paid for")).
98. Id. at 452.
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing Wagner v. Continental Casualty Co.. 421 N.W.2d 835, 842 (Wisc. 1988)).
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independent contractor. 10 1 Since independent contractors are usually
hired for their particular expertise, "the minority view penalizes
employers who hire experienced independent contractors with trained
employees to perform dangerous work, instead encouraging the
employer to use its own unskilled; untrained employees."102 Thus, the
court felt the minority view increases the risk of injury to the employer's
own employees, and also to the public.103 The court stated that by
encouraging the hiring of trained professionals to perform dangerous
work, the majority view better promotes the interests of safety for the
general public and for employees.1
04
The court also recognized that there are valid reasons to distinguish
between members of the public who are injured by the work and
independent contractors' injured employees. 105 The distinction is made
because members of the general public are usually unaware of any
danger the work creates, and are therefore unable to protect themselves
from possible injury.106 Employees of independent contractors, on the
other hand, are aware of the risk, and could therefore choose to take the
necessary precautions to prevent injury. 107 Sections 416 and 427 are
grounded in the rationale that dangerous work is tolerated as long as the
public has recourse against a financially responsible party.10g These
sections were not intended to protect the employees of independent
contractors, since they should be able to protect themselves from
possible risks and are already insured against injury by worker's
compensation.1 09 Thus, the court found no justification for applying
sections 416 and 427 to employees of independent contractors., 10
The court also found that allowing employees of independent
contractors a cause of action would create a "special" class of
employees.ll' Employees of independent contractors may attempt to
convince courts that their work was particularly dangerous, necessitating
an exemption from the exclusive remedy provisions of workers'
compensation."12 This would create a remedy for a special class of
101. Id.
102. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 452; Privette v. Superior Court, 854 P.2d 721, 727-28 (Cal. 1993);
Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384, 387-88 (Mo. 1991).
103. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 452. See Zueck, 809 S.W.2d at 387-88 (stating that the liability rules
as established keep the risk of injury lowest).
104. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 452.
105. Id. at 453.
106. Id. (citing Morris v. City of Soldotna, 553 P.2d 476,481-82 (Alaska 1976)).
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Coop., 606 S.W.2d 66.69 (Ark. 1980)).
109. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 453 (citing Jackson, 606 S.W.2d at 69).
110. Id. at 453-54.
111. Id. at 453 (citing Privette v. Superior Court, 854 P.2d 721,729 (Cal. 1993)).
112. Id. (citing Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384, 390 (Mo.
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employees which would not be available to regular employees.' 13
Furthermore, the court found that since these special employees already
received a higher wage due to their choice to undertake dangerous work,
allowing them a cause of action would produce an inequitable result. 114
Lastly, the court reasoned that since the Workers Compensation Act
statutorily releases the independent contractor from liability, the
employer is also released. 115 This precludes holding the employer
vicariously liable under sections 416 and 427.116 Allowing independent
contractors' employees to recover workers' compensation benefits in
addition to tort recovery, would violate the exclusive remedy provisions
of North Dakota's Workers' Compensation Act. 117
Based on the foregoing arguments, the North Dakota Supreme
Court adopted the majority view. 118 The court held that employees of
independent contractors are not included under the exceptions to the
general rule of non-liability of employers for the negligence of their
independent contractors, as stated in sections 416 and 427 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.]19 The court thus limited the application
of sections 416 and 427 of the Restatement to the general public.
IV. IMPACT
By holding that employees of independent contractors are not
included in the term "others," as used in sections 416 and 427 of the
Restatement, the North Dakota Supreme Court greatly limited the
application of sections 416 and 427.120 In so doing, the court has
limited alternative ways in which employees of independent contractors
may recover against the contractors' employers. Sections 416 through
429 of the Restatement, with the exception of section 426,121 create
1991)).
113. Id.
114. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 453.
115. Id. at 453-54 (citing Horejsi v. Anderson, 353 N.W.2d 316, 318 (N.D. 1984) (holding that
the release of a servant also releases the master from vicarious liability for the same conduct)).
116. Id.
117. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-01-08, 65-04-28 (1995) (providing that workers' com-
pensation benefits are an injured employee's sole remedy against a complying employer and that all
common law actions by an injured employee against a complying employer are barred, respectively).
118. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 453.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 453-54 (adopting the majority view that an independent contractor's employer is
not vicariously liable to the independent contractor's employees under §§ 416 and 427 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS).
121. Section 426 states that an employer of an independent contractor is not liable for injuries
caused by the contractor's "collateral negligence." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 426 (1965).
Collateral negligence is "negligence collateral to the contemplated risk." Id. § 426 cmt. a.
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exceptions to the general rule of employer non-liability by holding the
employers of independent contractors vicariously liable for the acts of
their contractors in specific situations. Several sections use the term
"others," or similar terms. 122  Based on the holding in Fleck,123 it is
likely that the North Dakota Supreme Court will similarly interpret the
language of other exceptions in the Restatement not to include
employees of independent contractors. Thus, it appears the impact of
Fleck may be to further limit the avenues of recovery for independent
contractors' employees by not allowing employers of independent
contractors to be held vicariously liable to the contractors' employees
under any of the Restatement's exceptions.124 Therefore, in many
situations, employees of independent contractors will be limited to
receiving workers' compensation benefits.
However, the Fleck decision does not limit independent contractors'
employees from holding the contractors' employers directly liable for
negligence. In a final footnote, the court stated that its decision not to
include independent contractors' employees under sections 416 and 427
did not conflict with previous decisions which allowed independent
contractors' employees to hold employers liable under section 414 of
the Restatement.125 Because section 414 imposes direct liability on the
employers of independent contractors, the court found that allowing
contractors' employees a cause of action under that section does not
conflict with the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act, since the act
does allow suits against third parties who are not the direct employer of
the employee.1 26  Generally, sections 410 through 415 of the
Restatement create exceptions to the general rule by holding the
122. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 417 ("members of the public"); Id. § 419 ("third
persons"); Id. § 420 ("others"); Id. § 421 ("others"); Id. § 422 ("others"); Id. § 427A ("others"); Id. §
427B ("others"); Id. § 428 ("others"). See also supra note 29 and accompanying text (listing these
exceptions with their titles).
123. Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522 N.W.2d 445,454 (N.D. 1994).
124. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 416-29 (containing exceptions to the general rule
of non-liability). See also supra note 29 and accompanying text (listing these exceptions with their
titles).
125. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 454 n.3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (holding that
employers of independent contractors are directly liable to "others" when they retain control of some
operative detail of the work and fail to exercise that control with due care). See Madler v. McKenzie
County, 467 N.W.2d 709, 711 (N.D. 1991) (finding an employer of an independent contractor owes a
duty to the contractor's employees under § 414).
126. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 454 n.3. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-09 (1995) (allowing injured
employees a right of action against third parties who cause the work-related injury). An independent
contractor's employer may be held to be the contractor's employee's "statutory employer," but only if
the employer is a general contractor and is liable for the payment of workers' compensation premiums
due to the failure of the independent contractor. Id. § 65-01-02(15)(c). For the reasons why allowing
independent contractors' employees a cause of action against contractors' employers under §§ 416




employers of independent contractors directly liable for negligently
selecting, instructing, or supervising their independent contractors.1 27
Based on the court's final footnote in Fleck,128 workers' compensation
does not affect the applicability of these sections of the Restatement
since they impose direct liability on the employer, not vicarious liability
through the contractor.129 Although Fleck will likely prevent employees
of independent contractors from holding the contractors' employers
vicariously liable, these employees can still hold the contractors'
employers directly liable. Therefore, in certain situations, independent
contractors' employees may still have a tort remedy in addition to their
workers' compensation benefits.
Timothy G. Richard
127. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (S EcOND) OF TORTS § 411 (imposing direct liability on an employer
for negligently selecting an independent contractor).
128. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 454 n.3.
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 410-15. See also supra note 29 and accompanying
text (listing exceptions with their titles).
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